The UK government’s growing reliance on US technology company Palantir to support data operations in public services has been criticised by a parliamentary committee as an “unacceptable point of weakness” that puts sensitive information at risk.
A report from the Commons Science, Innovation and Technology Committee highlights concerns about Palantir’s work with public bodies including the National Health Service and the Financial Conduct Authority. It emphasises the possible consequences of depending heavily on a small number of US-based technology providers for critical national infrastructure.
Palantir, founded in 2003, specialises in data analytics and has contracts with governments and large organisations worldwide. Its platform is designed to integrate data from multiple sources, potentially improving efficiency and decision-making. For the NHS, this means bringing together health data to assist hospitals in patient care and service delivery.
The company states it operates under public contract regulations and that data remains under the control of the NHS. The health service, in turn, says the technology has helped speed cancer diagnoses and allowed thousands of extra patients to receive treatment each month.
However, the parliamentary committee noted that this arrangement still raises ethical questions around privacy and the influence of large foreign firms over public data. The report warns that such dependence could leave UK public information vulnerable to interference from foreign actors, putting citizens’ privacy at risk.
To address these concerns, the committee recommends that the government exercises a break clause in Palantir’s NHS contract by 2027. It suggests seeking alternative providers based in the UK or investing in developing in-house technological solutions to reduce dependency.
Beyond contract specifics, the committee calls on the government to provide clearer plans for making the UK a “modern digital state.” It notes current gaps in data infrastructure and “serious data hygiene deficiencies” that challenge the delivery of digital services, including controversial proposals such as digital ID schemes.
Dame Chi Onwurah, chair of the committee, said the UK should aim for greater technology sovereignty in essential public services. She warned that relying heavily on a small number of major US tech companies leaves the UK “seriously exposed” and that vendor lock-in is not inevitable. Instead, smarter procurement strategies should support domestic technology alternatives.
This report highlights an important issue for UK public services and citizens alike. As public bodies increasingly rely on digital platforms to handle large volumes of personal data, the choices made now about suppliers and data governance will affect privacy, service continuity, and national control in the years ahead.
For households and individuals, this means staying informed about who holds and manages their data within public services and how government frameworks are evolving to safeguard it. Public confidence in digital health records, financial data, and identity services can be influenced by steps to reduce dependence on foreign platforms and strengthen domestic digital infrastructure.
Currently, Palantir continues to provide services under existing contracts. The government has yet to publish a detailed response to the committee’s recommendations. Meanwhile, close attention to upcoming contract decisions and public sector digital reforms could provide clearer insight into the future resilience and security of UK public data systems.
